Can there be a cartographic ethics? by Harley, J. B.
Number 10, Summer 1991 cartographic perspectives 9 
commentary 
In time you may discover all there 1s to discover - but your progress will 
onlv be progress away Crom mankind. The gulf between you and the people 
will become so great that one day vou will cry out m jubilation over a new 
,1.:h1evement - and be greeted by a crv of universal horror. 
Bertholt Brecht, The Life of Calih'01 
I nan event little reported in the media during the recent Iraq war, a demonstration was held outside the U.S. Defense Mapping Agency in 
St. Louis. lt concerned the cruciaJ role of maps in ou r ability to wage 
modem warfare: official estimates s tated that by 2nd January 1991 some 
35 million maps had been shipped to some 300,000 U.S. troops stationed 
in the Persian Gulf area.! Whatever our views about the morality of war, 
the incident serves to remind us that the making of maps can raise pro-
found ethical issues. In my case, it led me to reflect on the apparent lack 
of ethical discussion in the professional literature of cartography. Search 
long among the key words of periodical articles or books and "ethics" is 
usually missing. This means that m its failure to engage in a full and frank 
debate about ethics, cartography is out-of-step with other academic 
disciplines and professions. On the contrary, the discipline could be 
accused of complacency. Cartography seems to be uncritical of its own 
practices, and both their intentional and unintentional consequences. It 
certainly lacks a substantial literature in applied ethics comparable to that 
generated by many of its peer professions in science and technology. 
There is no group in cartography comparable to, for example, "Computer 
Professionals for Social Responsibility" founded in 198-!. And there are 
no, or few features such as tbe "Legal and Ethical" case notes, now 
published in the ACSM B11llefi11, in cartographic journals. In short, for 
many map-makers ethics remains a gray area, lost somewhere in the abyss 
that separates logic from the swamp of subjective opinion. 
All this surely has to change in the next few years. J am writing this 
essay m response to a pioneering "round table commentary" on "Ethical 
Problems in Cartography" - the first of its kind- published in the Fall 
1990 issue of Cnrtogrnphic Paspeclitics. Ethics was defined there as the 
"principles of conduct guiding the practices of an indi\-idual or profes-
sional group." Among the varied issues raised at the roundtable were 
some whICh may not immediately have struck all readers as obviously 
ethical problems. For instance, while the so-called "ethic" of being 
"precise. accurate. and exact" was plain enough, the moral aspects of the 
perennial copyright problem or the impact of new technology on the 
ability to maintain traditional standards and values raise finer points of 
definition. What, for a start, are the ''traditional standards and values" 
and have they ever existed except as a social construction of cartogra-
phers? Or why should commercial cartographers feel threatened by 
copynght violations other than for reasons of profit which may or may 
not be an ethical question? Other issue~ considered are the daim that 
some aspects of cartographic practice - such as the design and choice of 
symbols- are ethically neutral, and that "the false impression" that is 
sometimes given "that cartography is a science, based on objccti\·e prin-
ciples and criteria," is also ultimately a matter of ethics. 
r did not find myself in agreement with nil of the contributors and here 
J take issue with certain stated vicwpmnts. For example, the emphasis on 
the copyright question as a major ethical issue seems to be misplaced. 
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The old English rhyme tells us 
The law lodes up both man and woman 
Who steals the i;oose from olf the common 
But lets the greater felon loose 
Who steals the common from th<? goose • 
l suggest that the mdivtdual who "steals" the information on a copy 
righted map may be stealing the goose, but the greater moral dilemma is 
that the map, when it fails to be anythmg less than a socially responsible 
representation of the world, is bemg stolen from everyone. This is to put 
the issue rather starkly but I fceJ strongly that some different questions 
should be squarely posed. Can there be an ethica!Jy informed cartography 
and what should be its agenda? How can we go about formulating 
principles and rules that wou ld allow us to arbitrate moral judgments in 
particular cartographic circumstances? Can we debate cartographic ethics 
in the narrow arena of internal practice, looking for a pragmatic code of 
professional conduct, or should we be concerned "''ith transcendental 
\ alues that go to the heart of social justice m the world at large? Ralher 
than engage in generalities at this sta~e, I confine myself here to address-
ing these three questions, taking the last first. 
T he debate opened in Cartogrn11hic Pu~pcclivl'S 1s based, in my view, on a fundamental fallacy. This 1s the "cartographers know best" 
fallacy, the notion that O\·er the year-; cartographic practice and experience 
has resulted in normative rule. and principles that are because a consen-
sus exists about their value, m themselves ethical. ff they are widely 
accepted. and so long as thev are followed, the profession is "clean," and 
there will be no need to ask questions in an ethical context such as "What 
kind of map is good?" or 'What sort of cartography is just?" Michael 
Dobson produces an argument that enshrines this fallacy. He writes 
• in mv opinion . . most ol thc ,ub<,t.md.ud c<1rtogrnph1c product:. hub!.tan-
d.ird here is \.'qUi'lll'd with unrth1c<1ll arc the re5ult ol lndi\1duals who It.we not 
been properlv trained and not the wnrl.. o( ind1\'1du<il~ who .ue c:onsctou'\lv 
Irvin~ to m1:.lcad their ,1u1.licnc1: 
However. such a premise, far from tlddrcssmg fundamental ethical 
questions, bypasses them entire}~. Questions about the rightness of 
t~hnical practice are being contuseJ with questions about the rightness of 
the social consequences of map-makmg. While there may be moral 
aspects to both cases, l would argue that 1t 1s the ethics of the latter that 
should be addressed rather than \ alue 1udgments concerning the permts-
c;ibility or impermissibility of ttus or that technical practice. For instance. 
in everv map made bv a professional cartographer. some sort of judgment 
has to be made as to how to represent the world. Yet cartographers, 
though they are fuJh' aware how maps must d1:.tort reality, often engage 
in double-speak when defendm~ their !>UbJed \.\ e are told about the 
' parado\" in which an accurate map," to "pre:.ent a useful and truthful 
picture," must "tell white liL~.'" Enm leavmi; aside the element of special 
pleading in this :.tatcmcnt (the mt1p can be "truthful" and "<iccurate" even 
v. hen it isl~ ing). there b the coroll.1r\i tht1t cartographers mshnchvely 
.1ttribute the worst f<.)rrn::, ot "igm,r<"lnn.'." "blunder~" .ind "J i:.tortmns," 
and ::.o on to nun-cartographers. For in::.tancc. when thcv come to talk 
about propaganda map:. or the c:Mtogr.1ph1c d istortions presented by the 
popular media, a quite different order oi moral debate is entered into. The 
l"nt1se n:lciJre of the Peters projcchon led to an outburst of polemical righ-
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teousness in defense of "professional standards." But ethics demand 
honesty. The real issue in the Peters case is power: there is no doubt that 
Peters' agenda was the empowerment of those nations of the world he felt 
had suffered an historic cartographic discrimination. But equally, for the 
cartographers, it was their power and "truth claims" that were at stake. 
We can see them, in a phenomenon well-known to sociologists of science, 
scrambling to dose ranks to defend their established ways of representing 
the world. They are still dosing ranks. f was invited to publish a version 
of this paper in the ACSM Bulletin. After submission, r was informed by 
the edHor that my remarks about the Peters projection were at variance 
with an official ACSM pronouncement on the subject and that it had been 
decided not to publish my essay! Cartography will be unable to engage in 
an ethical debate while it continues to appeal only to its own intemaJ 
standards yet is morally blind to issues in the world outside. 
A similarly introspective technophilia is enshrined in the view that 
some aspects of cartography lie beyond the need for ethical consideration. 
fn the roundtable discussion it is suggested in the context of cartographic 
education that 
The majoritv ot information we 1mp;irt to <1tudent<o ... h;:is lutle to do with 
ethics. Recommendations on what line widths or what lettering sizes are 
harmonious or discriminate from one another are pl'!'ceptual and ae~thetic 
issues, not ethical ones. Suggestions on title placement is a design issue, not an 
ethical one. Convenb.ons on colormg a forested area green, or a water- body 
blue are iconicity issues. not ethical ones -
But is this really the case? It is well known - not the least in advertising 
- that every map represents a world view in miniature and its design is 
fraught with potential ethical consequences. Aesthetics is not a value-free 
science and it is as much a prisoner of ideology as the empirical content of 
the map.· The \A,'ay a word is written, the choice of name size, the selec-
tion of a color to represent an area, or the type of point symbol employed, 
are all part of the persuasive rhetoric of map-making. They may wield 
considerable power over the way we understand the world. For example, 
the symbols designed to represent towns or villages on a map may 
privilege some settlements while discriminating against others. fn a 
recent study of small-scale South African mapping ,,·care told how 
policies of apartheid have "created dormitory Slack townships adjacent to 
practically every White town an the country" and also a cartography that 
naturalizes this discrimination: 
\Vilh the prevalent design .1pproach u!.ed by rnrtogmphl!rs, many of these 
Black 5ettlcments have been JruJde invisible. This process of subjective 
generalization has tx."en achie\·ed subtly in recent vears b\• mapping a selection 
of Black settlements for which the style of symbolization used to mark them is 
downgraded • 
Here is a clear instance of where design and a moral judgment arc insepa-
rable. Though it is claimed Lhat such rnaps were ''more an act of negli-
gence than a deliberate attempt to deceive."" from an ideological stand-
point the map supports the powerful against the < •.lisenfranchised and 
makes notions of white supremacy seem more legitimate. 
It is the apparent ethical innocence of map design that can be so mis-
leading. Mark Monmonier has reminded us about the "seductiveness of 
color" but he cannot blame it all on "misuse by cartographically illiterate 
commercial artists." " Thus, despite his nssertion that ''the blueness of the 
water might exist largely in the minds of wishful cm·ironmentalisls, self-
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serving tourist operators, and gullible map readers," 1~ it is also a percep-
tion traditionally perpetuated by cartographers more than anyone else. 
So too is the decidedly Eurocentric convention that brown is the best 
color for terrain, contours, and land representation. It is a dubious logic 
that bro\.\rn is assumed to be "the fundamental color of soil ... evident in 
fresh tilled soil in spring," a statement that might apply to middle lati-
tude humid forest and steppe-land soils but is untrue for much of the rest 
of the world." Once it is accepted that certain conventions are "natural" 
or "normal," the danger is that they acquire a coercive and manipulative 
authority. The simplistic belief that "graphical excellence" and "graphi-
ca l integrity'' can be achieved by the application of hard-and-fast design 
rulesi< srmilarly lessens cartographers' maneuverability to portray the 
world ethically, that is to say, in ways that are sensitive to social needs. I 
am not advocating a form of design anarchy here, but merely suggesting 
that cartography runs the risk of being reduced to a series of graphic 
formulas detached from the consequences of representation. 
With the development of new institutionalized technologies such as 
Geographical Information Systems and automated cartography the 
likelihood increases that this will occur. The drive for standardization 
becomes ever more crucial to allow interchange between systems and to 
reduce confusion over technology. With this in mind, the U.S. Geological 
Survey is developing a national cartographic data standard.1' Yet is this 
entirely a step forward? ft could result in a further narrowing of the ways 
in which the d iversity of local landscape is mapped and it is saying, in 
effect, that there is only one way of showing a particular geographic 
fea ture despite any potential insensitivity to social and environmental 
issues in that form of representation. 
"Method" has thus become a main criterion for truth; moreover, it 
becomes in itself a specific category of truth, that of "cartographic truth." 
Invented by cartographers, map "truth" runs the danger of becoming a 
knowledge available only to the technical specialists and this (as Einstein 
once put it) "is almost as bad for art as for the artists, or religion for the 
priests." · lt is thus clear that the debate must be moved beyond a narrow 
intcmalist formulation of what 1s ethical in cartography. lf we a re truly 
concerned w ith the social consequences of what happens when we make 
a map, then we might also decide that cartography is too important to be 
left entirely to cartographers. 
I find two fundamental issues in the second question: how can we go about formulating principles <1nd rules that would support moral 
judgments in parhcular cartographic circumstances? TI1e first concerns 
the philosophy of cartography; the second the content of maps. The basic 
philosophy of many cartographers, as Sona Andrews points out in the 
round table discussion, would probably be that they are "doing a science" 
that is correct, accurate. and objective.' l agree that thb b a key ethical 
issue and, indeed, it is this positivism, fueled by recent technological 
developments, that is beckoning cartographers away from the very 
ethical issues now espoused by other professions. Even as the twm 
themes of innovation and technologica l revolution are loudly proclaimed 
(the latter with almost Maoist fervor)'', so the social implications of the 
cartographic Prometheus unbound - such as increased surveillance of 
the indhidual - are largely overlooked. The tendency is to shrug off 
alternati\'e views of the nature of maps, especially those that open up 
humanistic perspectives. The result is the sort of tunnel vision that must 
have Led Duane Marble to remark of map projections, which he sees 
merely as a mathematical transformation, that ''\t escapes me how 
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politics, etc, can enter into it."•· With vie'''S like this, there will be no truly 
open debate until cartographers shed at least some of their notions of 
scientific essentialism. My argument is that this traditional philosophical 
foundation should be critically examined. Alternative views about the 
nature of maps need to be seriously evaluated. Could it be that what 
cartographers do, albeit unwittingly, is to transform by mapping the 
subject they seek to mirror so as to create not an image of reality, but a 
simulacrum that redescribes the world?" This alternative vie'"' of what a 
map is would allow us to embrace a much more open, self-critical, socially-
sensitive, politically street-wise approach to the practice of map-making 
and the objectives of cartographic activity. 
Thus even the apparently arcane ontological and epislemological 
questions must be part of the debate. They too raise issues of practical 
ethical concern. Our philosophy - our understanding of the nature of 
maps - ic; not merely a part of some abstract intellectual analysis but 
" major strand in the web of social relations by which cartogra-
i.xt their values into the world. 
::>eco11 .... . . 11cre is the content of maps. Not only how cartographers 
believe they represent the world, but even more what they emphasize and 
what they silence, and how features are classified and given hierarchy, 
adds up, in effect, to a moral statement. Each map is a manifesto for a set 
of beliefs about the world. ln many unremarked instances a map may be 
an act of empowerment or of disenfrandusement in the construction of 
social relationships. Thus, the content of maps will increasingly become a 
moral dilemma for cartographers if they accept their responsibilities for 
reconstructing the world that the surveyor has deconstructed. Whether 
through choice or through the "advance" in technology we are increas-
ingly witnessing the death of the map author, a situation in which the 
cartographer, in most cases, has ceased to be the initiator of the map.~1 
This is largely related to what Patrick McHaffie defines as the organization 
of the cartographic labor process.!J But it is also ironic that this loss of 
cartographic autonomy has been promoted by the cartographers' own 
narrowing of their field of operations, designed to enhance their image as 
an independent profession, but effectively confining their role to the 
design and generalization of other people's data. Apart from the fact that 
this undermmes cartography's claim to be a science even in any nonnal 
understanding of that word, it embodies an ethical dimension. Maps, 
rather than resulting from primary observations of the world, are increas-
ingly derived from secondary packages of predetermined information. 
Thus, when the data arrives in the cartographer's hands the map is already 
"pre-censored;" it is often too late to challenge its content from an ethical 
standpoint. 
Such restrictions placed on what a map can show is a key ethical issue. 
If the moraJ contours of the shape of the world have already been drawn 
by others - usually those m positions of p<>wer - then the danger is that 
the cartographer is relegated to becoming a robotic arm of an institutional 
or commercial patron. Map-makers have to ask themselves how, if they so 
desire, they can recapture control over the morality of the map, so that the 
cartographk author is able to exercise ethical judgment. Otherwise we 
may create a design masterpiece but it will merely be a projection of an 
unethic;il landscape in whose making we have no part and for whose 
social consequences we have abrogated responsibility. 
F inally, an answer to the first question, "Can th!"re be an ethically infom1ed cartography and, if so, what should be its agenda?" is more 
difficult to arrive at. As I hope I have made clear, from issues that are 
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already surfacing. the answer to lhe first part b "yec;" Where to go next is 
less clear. What cartographers most earne:;tly seek 1s probably not so 
much a theoretical as a practical ethics, a set of principles that can be used 
to clarify moral disagreements or conflicts ~vith the goal of resolving them. 
It would certainly helo, as a first step, to have more documented facts 
about ethical issue:. in cartograph\ What are the motives and personal 
engagements of cartographers \\rith the map:. the\i make? What are the 
relationships between production and consumption m cartography aJld 
GIS? How do pracbces such ,,c; the ltm1tahon of access to official informa-
tion <through the policies of sccrccv or pncm~ it beyond the means of 
ordinary citizens),=• the omission of toxic waste sites from USGS maps, the 
inclusion of pejorative ethnic names on maps, or the Eurocentrism of 
many maps and atlases. actually influence the way people think about 
and act upon social issues in a democracy? What arc the moral benefits or 
deficits of particular ways of mapping the world? This should be the 
bottom line of the balance sheet of cartography. and the time may be 
overdue when such questions about the human consequences of making 
particular kinds of maps are researched in our graduate schools. 
A second step would be to trv to resolve underlying conceptual d is-
agreements about the claims to truth of cartograplw. This would invol\'e 
a reexamination of the nature of map.., along the Imes I have suggested. 
But, thirdly, there should be an effort to link cartographic ethics to wider 
social questions. \Nhat are the principle.; of ..,ocial 1usticc that ought to be 
endorsed by cartographers7 Should map., merely be an mert mirror of 
majoril) values or can they pla) a wider role in the struggle for soda] 
improvement? Can there be a normative ethics or do we slide into a cozy 
relativism in which cartographic values vary "ith d1fferent societies, 
generations, social groups, or indh·iduah.? Can any of us have a priv;-
leged claim to ethical truth or must we accept the idea that what might be 
a good map for one society, culture, or group might be harmful for 
another? Where such conflicts occur 1s there a pnnopled way of judging 
between them if there are no transcendental or absolute moral values? 
Cartographers have yet to grapple with these difficult questions. Many 
arc likely to be resolved only at the level of social policy. Indeed, the final 
ethical question mciy be one of just how far c;irtographcrs of all shades of 
opinion are prepared to be politically acti\e in altenng the conditions 
under whkh they make maps. I low much do they care about the world 
they portray? Institutional rules, regulations, and laws (such as those that 
govern federal or corporate cartographers), all ha' e an ethical dimension 
that may clash with the individual consciem:e. Those who believe that the 
map is impartial and value-neutral may argue that cartographers- as 
befits a "scientific" profession - must remam neutral at every cost. Yet 
this reminds me of a remark made by the video-cult personality Max 
Headroom, who says "I only invent the bomb, I don't drop it."r We could 
paraphrase this for those cartographers who say "l only draw the map, 
I'm not responsible for how it's used or what it does." 
For others. however, there 1s a different moral position. It involves 
accepting the linkage between knowledge and power. OnJv then will we 
agree with those who have already pointed out that cartographv is 
pohhazed and it always has been: 
We will only be ablt! to think clearly ,1bout our ~11uat1on once this 1s recognized. 
We will not be able to make mtl!lh~t>nt chmn.'l> until, h.wm~ accepted our 
pohhcal mstrumentahtv. we fully debilh' \lUr :;itu.1t111n with tl11!> 111 mind. 
1 here will materialize Cartographers for Peace and Cnrtoi.;rnphers for a Strong 
Defense, but at least we will be through pretend in~ that we are not completelv 
invl1lved ~ 
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Being involved on matters of conscience is an important aspect not only of 
social responsibility but also of true professionalism. At a moment when 
global technology is weaving an ever more impenetrable curtain between 
the makers and users of maps this has become urgent: 
we have to learn new standards of responsible conduct in our use of 
mformallon technology. we need to reformulate what's nght and wh.lt'c; 
wrong. e:.pec1allv ma world m which human and :>Ocial relabons. mcreasinglv. 
are endll~"h reprogrammable, after the fashion of human/machine interlaces 
Ethic-; 1s \ 'l'l') much back on the a!Zenda for intellectuals ma technocracv where 
efnoencv and rationalH:y are seen as presiding. without passion. o\•er J regime 
of instrumental problem-SOI Ying zo 
Can there be a cartographic ethics? lt is doubtful if either more internal 
design "solutions," or the unfettered working of a free market in commer-
cial cartography,'' wllJ result in the truly ethical map. Ethics cannot be 
divorced from questions of social justice. To do nothing would be to 
sanction a world closer to Bertholt Brecht's vision of the future than one in 
which morally responsible cartographers would choose to live. <p 
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